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 Abstract 
A central topic for social psychology is how we identify, categorise or represent 
ourselves to ourselves and to each other. Previous work on this topic stemming from 
attribution theory, social identity theory, self-categorisation theory and social 
representations theory, has tended to accept the dominant cognitivist tenet of an 
interior self which is (with varying degrees of success) re-presented in ordinary 
discourse. Against this tradition, and drawing on membership categorisation 
analysis, we argue here for an attention to ordinary members’ methods of 
categorising the self.  Such devices are constitutive of a culture. Accounts of the self 
(whether lay or professional) cannot avoid reliance on such devices. 
  Our particular case involves a corpus of materials from the press surrounding the 
Port Arthur massacre: the shooting of thirty-five people by a lone gunman, Martin 
Bryant, in Tasmania in 1996. In this case, where public accountings for what ‘makes 
up’ a particular person are tied to an otherwise inexplicable but ultra-newsworthy 
event, we find that lay and professional methods of accounting are remarkably 
congruent. One of the reasons for this congruence, we suggest, is that the 
categorisation of persons is a fundamentally moral matter. Devices for producing 
everyday moral accounts, in actual practical circumstances, precede and ground, for 
example, ‘technical’, ‘clinical’ or ‘scientific’ judgments. We conclude that describing 
such routine (but ultimately grounding) cultural devices can be a central goal of 
social psychology, as opposed to explaining ‘the self’ by tacitly relying upon those 
same devices in an unacknowledged and unproblematised fashion. 
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When, as happened at Port Arthur, Tasmania, in April 1996, someone goes out and 
shoots down thirty-five people, the grounds for explanation become problematic: for 
the courts, for those who knew the gunman personally, for psychological and 
psychiatric experts, and for the journals of record. In contrast to established social 
psychological work on the methods by which persons categorise such actions and 
the individuals who perform them, we use membership categorisation analysis 
(MCA) to look at the forms of identification employed (officially and unofficially) to 
try to account for such a case in newspaper coverage of both the shootings, and the 
subsequent trial of the perpetrator Martin Bryant. In the ‘lay’ accounts of the 
perpetrator and his actions reported in the newspapers, we see little evidence of a 
confusion of understandings (or ‘representations’, c.f. Morant, 1995) — rather we 
encounter a range of commonsense categories which explain the shootings in terms 
of the madness, peculiarity and/or ‘otherness’ of Martin Bryant. However, turning 
to the accounts of the ‘experts’ what we find is a series of incongruities amounting to 
a paradox. For the psychiatric experts, the mass murderer is ‘personality disordered’ 
but not insane; he is intellectually deficient but insufficiently retarded to be 
exculpable (e.g., as ‘criminally insane’). The central question addressed in this study 
then, is: is this precarious professional identification any different from everyday 
commonsense categories such as ‘psycho’, ‘nut’ and the rest when it comes to doing 
the moral work of categorisation and explanation? 
 
Approaches to categorisation 
The matter of identification, or categorisation, has long been central to social 
psychology. A variety of approaches — from attribution theory (Heider, 1958), social 
identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987) to social 
representations theory (Moscovici, 1984) — have sought to account and how 
identification is accomplished, for how persons and their actions are categorised. 
From Heider on, these theoretical approaches have not only idealised ordinary 
persons and sought to explain their (equally idealised) ghostly internal mechanisms, 
but have also implicitly or explicitly relegated ‘lay’ or ‘ordinary’ accounts, 
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‘expert’, ‘scientific’ accounts (Antaki, 1994). 
  In keeping with the prevailing cognitivist emphasis in contemporary social 
psychology, self-categorisation theory (SCT), for example, suggests that individuals 
account for their own identity in specific circumstances via an in(tro)spection of an 
‘output’ — or ‘specific self-image’ — that is ‘switched on’ by social circumstances. 
Turner et al., for example, suggest that: 
the functioning of the social self-concept is situation specific: particular self-
concepts tend to be activated (‘switched on’) in specific situations, producing 
specific self-images ... as a function of the interaction between the 
characteristics of the perceiver and the situation. (Turner et al., 1987, p. 44) 
Such formulations, described elsewhere as a form of ‘cultural dopism’ (McHoul & 
Rapley, 2001), inevitably produce a theory of categorisation-in-practice as the 
product of a mechanistic and depersonalised cognitive machinery. On such 
accounts, the categorisation (identification) of self and others is not so much an 
activity performed by persons in specific social situations for particular (social, 
personal, rhetorical) purposes but is, rather, a deterministic mental process which, 
‘activated’ by features of the situation, merely animates its passive human vehicle.  
  While accounts of categorisation offered by social representations theory benefit 
from recognising that representations can be theorised as both ‘cognitive structures’ 
as well as ‘public rhetorics’ (Breakwell, 1993, p. 2), work in this tradition still faces a 
number of problems engendered by precisely this insistence on the double life of 
categories, and an essentially structuralist, reductionist, account of ‘representations’ 
or categories (Potter & Wetherell, 1998). 
  A considerable body of work has examined social representations of ‘mental 
illness’ or ‘madness’ (for example, Gigling, Guimelli, & Penochet, 1996; Jodelet, 1991; 
Petrillo, 1996; Wagner et al., 1999). This work has noted that both ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ 
representations of ‘mental illness’ are describable as ‘multiple, complex and 
encompass[ing] a range of ambivalent reactions’ (Morant, 1995, p. 11). Yet it has not 
addressed the point that representations/categories may be more profitably 
understood not as fixed, yet changeable, a priori cognitive or rhetorical ‘structures’, 
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deployment for specific purposes. Such a respecification moves us away from the 
sort of questions posed, for example, by Breakwell (1993) in her proposal to effect a 
merger of social identity theory and social representations theory — questions like: 
Why don’t all group members share x representation of y? How is it that some 
individuals can reproduce or accept a particular representation while others cannot? 
What determines the actual form of a given representation? These questions begin 
by assuming that representations/categorisations exist in some a priori form. Our 
respecification begins by asking what categorisations can do and moves us towards 
an analysis of the way they are used in everyday social practices, rather than 
considering them as reified objects in social scientific space. 
  Stemming from Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) classic text, work in discursive 
psychology has begun to draw attention to the shortcomings of traditional social 
psychological accounts of members’ practices of categorising and representing 
themselves. Drawing on work in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 
inspired by Harvey Sacks (1992), studies in this tradition have pointed to the 
flexibility and indexicality of categorisations and identity claims or ascriptions in 
everyday (as opposed to experimental) usage. Discursive psychological work — 
such as that of Potter and Edwards (1990) on attitudes, categories (Edwards, 1998), 
causal explanations (Edwards, 1995; Edwards & Potter, 1993), and on the close link 
between description and explanation in commonsense accounts (Edwards & Potter, 
2001) — has, in its questioning of the adequacy of mainstream social psychological 
accounts, given rise to a body of work which has begun to respecify how matters of 
identity and categorisation may be approached. Antaki, et al (1996), for instance, 
examined naturally-occurring conversation and demonstrated the moment-by-
moment fluidity of the identities invoked by ‘speakers’ own orientations’. In his 
analysis of couple counselling, Edwards (1998) illuminated the highly specific, and 
intensely local, interactional work which particular descriptions of ‘salient’ features 
of persons can accomplish in terms of the candidate social identity proposed for 
particular individuals. Similarly, in their analyses of set-piece political speeches, 
Rapley (1998) and LeCouteur, et al (2001) have shown that theoretical accounts of 
categorisation which rely upon notions of perceptuo-cognitive automaticity not only Mentality or Morality? | page 5 
miss the specific rhetorical and practical work that categorisations do, but are also 
difficult to sustain in the face of the examination of actual social practices. In this 
paper then, we draw upon work in discursive psychology, particularly that 
informed by membership categorisation analysis, and set out to examine how 
particular forms of categorisation do social and moral work in actual, naturally-
occurring, use. As we show, in this extension of our earlier analysis (see McCarthy 
and Rapley, 2001), such categorisation devices are generally and equally relied upon 
by both lay and professional (here, forensic psychological and psychiatric) accounts 
of the event in question, a ‘mass murder’. 
 
Historical background 
In November 1996, a twenty-nine year-old Tasmanian named Martin Bryant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment on thirty-five counts of murder for which he had 
been indicted after the shootings at the historic site of Port Arthur in April of the 
same year. In sentencing him, Chief Justice Cox told the court that consideration of 
the prisoner’s mental condition at the time of the shootings was at the ‘forefront’ of 
the case. Regardless of his change of plea to ‘guilty’ during the trial, it was possible 
for the Court to find that Bryant was not criminally responsible for his actions under 
the insanity provisions of Tasmania’s Criminal Code 1924. In order for an insanity 
defence under Section 381 to apply, the Court had to be satisfied that Bryant was 
afflicted with a ‘mental disease’, to the extent that he was unable to understand ‘the 
physical character’ of his actions or to know that he should not have acted as he did 
(Section 16). It is explicitly provided that ‘mental disease’ includes ‘natural 
imbecility’ (Section 16(4)). Insanity, under these terms, operates as a defence (Section 
381) so that the Court may return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. There 
is also, under Section 16(3), a delusion provision: if affected by a delusion, but 
otherwise criminally responsible (i.e., not insane according to the preceding 
subsections) one can be found to be only responsible for what one believed to be the 
case. An example would be if, at the time, Bryant was not ‘insane’ but thought that 
everyone was out to get him.i Such a verdict (and the disposal options so afforded) 
turn as much on the moral as the legal status accorded to the accused. The ‘insane’ Mentality or Morality? | page 6 
(including the ‘imbecile’) by virtue of their membership in these categories, are 
excluded from the category ‘ordinary accountable actor’ and are, as such, exempted 
from moral responsibility for their actions. 
  Three forensic psychiatrists and a forensic psychologist were given the task of 
assessing Bryant’s psychological condition and, despite disagreement among the 
psychiatrists as to the correct diagnosis, all agreed that while Bryant ‘suffered’ from 
a ‘significant personality disorder’, he was not insane. Other (psychological) 
evidence suggested that while Bryant had an IQ of 66, this level of intelligence did 
not imply that he was sufficiently impaired to satisfy the criteria for ‘natural 
imbecility’. The judge accepted the psychiatric account, acknowledging Bryant to 
have been ‘grossly disturbed from early childhood’. He added: ‘[T]hat the prisoner, 
through these handicaps ... has developed into a pathetic social misfit calls for 
understanding and pity even though his actions demand condemnation’. 
  The Port Arthur massacre (as it came to be known) attracted considerable media 
interest throughout Australia and overseas. In the Australian press, journalists were 
unanimous that Bryant was a culpable agent deserving of the severest punishment; 
but most conceded that they could not answer their own most pressing question: 
why did he do it? The shootings placed heavy demands on the news media for 
explication of the event and what ‘manner of a person’ its perpetrator was. As the 
editorial in The Australian (Extract 1) immediately after the shootings shows, the 
fourth estate was well aware of its institutional role in both rehearsing society’s 
‘expected queries’ about such momentous happenings, and also of its (self-
appointed) responsibility for offering definitive accounts of them.  
Extract 1: ‘Violence the resort of young, disturbed men’ 
The Port Arthur massacre has raised the expected queries of what manner of 
person would go berserk in this fashion and how far the crimes could have 
been anticipated. Without wishing to pre-empt later legal findings the report 
thus far is that the killer is a young man believed to have had a history of 
mental illness. How is it possible that such an apparently disturbed young 
man has escaped scrutiny for so long? 
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As is further apparent from this extract, in the immediate recourse to the category 
‘mental illness’ as an explanatory resource, the media drew upon (and in so doing 
reproduced) the ‘institutionalised’ common sense of the culture on which they were 
reporting. 
  The matter-of-fact tone adopted in the editorial (re)presents and naturalises the 
mundane notion that only madness could account for Bryant’s actions. However, 
despite (or perhaps because of) its seeming transparency and taken-for-grantedness, 
this is not a notion that can be left unexamined. The flexibility and fluidity of 
psychiatric diagnostic categories — and their local and contingent deployment to 
manage the moral status and moral accountability of Bryant in the print media — 
form the focus of the rest of this paper. 
 
Theoretical and methodological background 
As we have seen, there is a considerable body of work on what may, broadly, be 
called the ‘representation’ of ‘mental illness’. A related body of work has specifically 
examined the representation of madness in the media. With very few exceptions  
this literature focuses on the errors or contradictions in media depictions of the 
‘facts’ about ‘mental illness’, noting the ongoing ‘stigmatisation’ of the ‘mentally ill’ 
(see for example: Conrad, 2001; Diefenbach, 1997; Hannigan, 1999; Hyler, Gabbard, 
& Schneider, 1991; Jorm, 2000; Martinez et al., 2000; Petrillo, 1996; Philo, 1994; Rose, 
1998; Wahl, 1992; Wilson et al., 1999). 
  Here we wish to add to the very small corpus which does not presuppose the 
veridicality or correctness of psychiatric categorisation, and which does not take the 
‘errors’ of the media as its analytic premise — most notably Eglin and Hester’s 
(1999a; 1999b) elegant use of membership categorisation analysis in their study of 
practical reasoning in the reported utterances and posthumously available textual 
materials of the perpetrator of the 1989 Montreal massacre, Marc Lepine; the work of 
Leudar and Thomas (2000) on the ‘frenzy of Anthony Smith’ as recounted in the 
British press and Jalbert’s (1999) edited collection on ethnomethodologically-
inspired approached to media studies.  
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  Following ethnomethodological findings that professional/scientific resources 
are, ultimately, minor transformations of generally-available lay resources, we offer 
a demonstration of the analytic power of Membership Categorisation Analysis to 
illuminate very precisely the way in which such matters as the ‘correctness’ of 
psychiatric classifications are not merely issues of professional disputation, but are 
rather always already ordinary members’ concerns. We do not seek to stipulate what 
is to count as the ‘correct’ use of psychiatric terms, or indeed what is to count as a 
psychiatric category qua psychiatric category a priori. To do so would simply buy 
into the notion which psychiatry (and much social psychology) trades upon; namely 
that terms have some fixed referent outside of the occasion of their use. To anticipate 
our argument, we do not see any clear and principled way to draw lines of 
epistemological — as opposed to moral — demarcation between these ‘lay’ and 
‘expert’ usages. 
  We examine the ways in which the (notionally scientific) categories of psychiatry 
and clinical psychology are deployed in the media as an institutional explanatory 
resource for the moral categorisation of troublesome social actors and, reflecting 
their more pervasive cultural use, as an apparatus for the moral management of 
unwanted conduct. This paper thus employs the theoretical and technical tools of 
MCA to contribute another case study to an ongoing analysis of psychiatry-as-social-
practice. Studies of psychiatry-as-social-practice have typically focused on 
theoretical critique of professional texts (see for example Sarbin & Mancuso, 1984; 
Boyle, 2002). In contrast, our analysis looks at how psychiatric activities such as 
‘diagnosis’ are played out in public media discourse. As Leudar and Thomas (2000) 
and Leudar and Nekvapil (2000) have shown, materials such as newspaper stories, 
letters to the editor and news interviews do not exist in vacuo but are best seen as 
part of a broader dialogically distributed network of ‘conversation’. 
  Our analysis rests on two observations made by Harvey Sacks (1992). Firstly 
Sacks’s insight that, in coming to understand a culture, one may assume that 
cultures show order at all points and, second, that descriptions of persons and their 
actions may be ‘correct’ in an indefinite number of ways — such that mere 
‘correctness’ cannot be the basis for selecting any given description. Mentality or Morality? | page 9 
  Schegloff puts the Sacksian position on the issue of ‘order’ very clearly, 
contrasting it with the idea that valid results can only be arrived at by properly 
sampling (and then aggregating) instances of a cultural phenomenon: 
Sacks points out that [sampling] depends on the sort of order one takes it that 
the social world exhibits. An alternative to the possibility that order manifests 
itself at an aggregate level and is statistical in character is what he terms the 
‘order at all points’ view. This view … understands order not to be present 
only at aggregate levels and therefore subject to an overall differential 
distribution, but to be present in detail on a case by case, environment by 
environment basis. A culture is not then to be found only by aggregating all 
of its venues; it is substantially present in each of its venues. (Schegloff in 
Sacks, 1992, p. xlvi) 
The importance of this first observation for our analysis is that so-called ‘positivistic’ 
methods in psychology — based as they are upon an aggregationist model that is 
absolutely essential to the natural sciences — must always miss the equally essential 
cultural (and therefore non-aggregable) grounds of human action (see McHoul and 
Rapley, 2001). A close enough look at a ‘molecular’ instance (a fragment) of a moral-
cultural universe will reveal important properties of its whole: cultural-moral 
phenomena will show up in regular ways regardless of sampling, distribution, 
aggregation, statistical techniques, etc.  
  With regard to the second observation, Sacks, in contrast to the ‘correspondence 
theory’ of categorisation frequently adopted by psychiatry and psychology, argues 
that there can be indefinitely many ‘correct descriptions’ of persons (or 
‘identifications’, as he calls them). The correctness of the identification is not the 
point, however.ii The point is that particularly selected correct identifications can do, 
among many other things, explanatory work: 
We can start out by noticing that the problem of selecting identifications is by 
no means a simple one. It is in principle never the case that persons are 
simply faced with applying a correct identification. And the procedures 
whereby they then go about selecting identifications in systematic ways, are a 
major problem for us. Now one whole range of ways that identifications get Mentality or Morality? | page 10 
picked turns on category-bound activities. (Sacks, 1992, p. 588) 
By ‘category-bound activities’, Sacks means kinds of actions routinely associated 
with particular categories of persons, such that if the category is known, then the 
activity can be inferred — and vice versa. Hence, if I tell you that a particular person 
wears a particular uniform and drives a red van from house to house delivering 
letters, you can hear the specific category (from the membership categorisation 
device (MCD) ‘occupations’) to which they belong. And vice versa: if I tell you that 
someone is a ‘postman’, you can hear from this description alone their expectable 
(category-bound) activities. 
  MCDs are then superordinate collections of individual category memberships 
along with specific rules of application.iii  The MCD ‘family’, for instance collects 
together categories/identities such as ‘mother’, ‘baby’, ‘father’, ‘brother’, ‘sister’ and 
so on. It is by virtue, Sacks suggests, of the existence of MCDs that a pair such as 
‘The baby cried. The mommy picked it up’ is routinely hearable as referring to the 
picking up of the baby which belongs to the mommy (despite the absence of a 
genitive) and not to a stranger, a neighbour or the plumber (Sacks, 1992). 
  Perhaps most importantly, these inferable ties between categories of person and 
their category-bound activities can have explanatory value. If some action is known 
to have occurred (e.g., a migrant neighbourhood was attacked) then, if there is a 
category of person for whom that action is ‘category-bound’, it can be routinely 
inferred that that category of person (‘racists’) was responsible for the action. Then, 
should it turn out that such a perpetrator was in fact responsible, that finding (e.g., 
‘It was a racially-motivated group’) can be used as an explanation of the event: 
In the first instance, a way that you go about selecting an identificatory 
category — given, say, that some action is going on, done by some person — 
is to determine if there is a category-bound activity of that sort, and if that 
person is a member of that category, then use that category to identify them. 
Now these kinds of things are not just ‘correct descriptions’, they’re correct 
descriptions in quite powerful ways.... Whereas lots of category-and-activity 
combinations will pose problems like ‘Why in the world did that happen?’, 
‘Gee, isn’t that unusual’, in the specific cases where you’ve got a category-Mentality or Morality? | page 11 
bound activity and the category for that is applied to some scene, why the 
thing happened is not a question. That it happened is explained by the very 
characterization. (Sacks, 1992, pp. 588-589; our emphasis) 
  We follow Sacks’s lead in assuming that, in the examination of fragments of a 
culture (e.g., newspaper articles), what operates across a culture as a whole, will 
come clearly into view — and professionals such as forensic psychiatrists can never 
be exempted from being cultural members in this respect, despite claims to, for 
example, ‘scientific indifference’. And we also (with regard to his second 
observation) assume that, when we look at such ‘holographic’ fragments, we will 
find more than mere ‘names’ and ‘events’ — as perhaps is assumed by both 
cognitive social psychology and ‘neutral’ journalistic reporting. If Sacks is right, we 
will also find logically-implied and naturally-inferable explanations in the obvious-
but-unstated connections between ‘identifications’ (ways of referring to persons) and 
‘activities’ (ways of referring to what they did). 
  What we seek to do here, then, is to examine the way in which a sample of the 
Australian print media’s reporting of events at Port Arthur deploys characterisations 
of Bryant in the service of explaining the massacre (a term that, as in the case of the 
Montreal ‘massacre’, is not ours, but the media’s and which clearly does its own 
work on constructing the events it (merely) appears to describe). We examine how 
the press reproduces and underpins the intertextuality of commonsense and 
psychiatric ‘thinking’; and simultaneously, how it exposes the contingent — and 
inescapably moral — functions which such ‘psychiatric’ categorisation serves. 
 
Materialsiv 
All of Australia’s daily and weekend quality national and capital city papers (The 
Australian, The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald, The West Australian, The 
Brisbane Courier-Mail, The Canberra Times and The Hobart Mercury) — roughly 
analogous to ‘broadsheet’ newspapers in Britain — were searched for stories 
reporting, or editorials commenting upon, the Port Arthur shootings and the later 
trial of Martin Bryant in the period between the date of the shootings (April 28th 
1996) and the conclusion of the trial (November 22nd 1996). All stories about the case Mentality or Morality? | page 12 
were collected. As our specific interest here is in the use of ‘lay’ and ‘specialist’ 
deployment of ‘psychiatric’ membership categories, we have selected examples from 
those parts of our corpus which specifically and hearably invoke ‘mental state’ or, 
otherwise, ‘psychiatric’ categorisations, be they ‘lay’ or ‘professional’. The extracts 
presented are not, following Sacks, intended to be a ‘statistically representative 
sample’ in the way in which those terms are routinely understood in contemporary 
social psychology. Rather, what the extracts offer is a set of perspicuous instances of 
the categorisation work we discuss — as such we do not offer here a gerrymandered 
set of best possible cases to support our analysis. We have repeatedly trawled our 
data corpus for variant materials — what, at the risk of some ambiguity in the 
present context, are sometimes called ‘deviant cases’. The nearest instance we could 
find involves a set of reported statements from a spokesperson for the Schizophrenia 
Fellowship which blended both ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ terms (‘Schizophrenics “run for 
cover”’, The Canberra Times, 30th June, 1996). 
 
Manufacturing the ‘psychiatric case’ 
The focus of this analysis then is on the descriptions of Bryant in newspaper texts 
which attend to the necessity of accounting for the events at Port Arthur, or which 
report on the consequences of those events. We examine what journalists, as 
members of a shared social order, count as valid descriptions of the nature of 
persons and the reasons for their actions, and the work such identifications 
accomplish. We briefly outline the candidate membership categories offered by the 
media reporting of the events and then examine, in more detail, specific instances of 
the deployment of ‘psychiatric’ membership categories by those with (and without) 
ratified expertise in the use of these categories. 
  While initial reports of the shootings offered a variety of candidate membership 
categories in their accounts of Bryant, all converged on commonsense 
understandings of deviance. That is, acts understandable a priori as non-normative 
(here, engaging in multiple killings of strangers) were characterised by the 
presentation of complementarily deviant identity categories. While many specific 
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membership categorisation device ‘deviant’ when applied to an adult male. For 
example Bryant was variously characterised as ‘a Jekyll and Hyde’ (‘Violent loner 
spooked locals’, The Australian, 30th April 1996), as ‘a man who sleeps with his pet 
piglet’ and as an ‘eight year old’ (‘Neighbours tell of suspect’s “bizarre” habits’, The 
Canberra Times, 30th April 1996). Over the course of 1996, and particularly during 
the trial, the initially fragmented media characterisations of Bryant coalesced around 
three categorisations: ‘monster’, ‘madman’ and ‘child’. Here we restrict ourselves to 
an examination of the delicate discursive production of Bryant’s membership in the 
category ‘madman’/‘psychiatric case’. 
  In characterising Bryant the print media employed both ‘professional’ and ‘lay’ 
genres of non-normal mental state categorisation dialogically to bolster the other: 
that is both everyday and psychiatric accounts were employed to present a 
congruence between ‘expert’ and ‘ordinary’ versions of Bryant’s mental state, and to 
secure an explanation of the shootings by virtue of Bryant’s categorisation as 
psychiatrically disturbed. In the following extract, a former neighbour of Bryant’s 
describes his experience of the day of the shootings: 
Extract 2: ‘Explosion of a violent loner’ 
‘I had to stop a couple of times and think was this real. Then I realised the 
mongrel on the killing spree was the joker who had lived next door. He was a 
nut, a psycho’, said Mr Featherstone. 
(The Australian, 30th April 1996) 
There are a number of points of interest in this extract. Firstly we observe the 
direction given to the reader of the sense to be made of the story in the headline: that 
(in this textual context) ‘explosions’ are assumed to be the natural predicates of the 
(unnatural, asocial, odd) membership category ‘loner’. Here ‘explosion’ is obviously 
metaphorical and sits alongside such descriptions as ‘losing it’, ‘going off one’s 
rocker’, and the rest. That it is so is marked by the absence of qualification, such that 
we do not read of, for example, a ‘surprise explosion’ or a ‘baffling explosion’. In 
short, ‘loner’ and ‘explosion’ (in this particular sense) are assembled here as two 
expectably congruent descriptions. So, even to begin with, we sense that the mode of 
categorisation is primarily a moral one. Secondly we observe that the immediacy Mentality or Morality? | page 14 
and factuality of this account of Bryant and his actions is heightened by the use of 
direct reported speech (Holt, 2000): these do not come across as the mere 
speculations of a journalist, but as the vivid recollections of an eyewitness. We 
further note the careful contrast reportedly worked up by Mr Featherstone between 
his own status as an observer and checker of the facts and Bryant’s status as careless 
(he was on a ‘spree’), out of control and, by implication, out of touch with the 
‘reality’ that Featherstone has had to ‘stop a couple of times and think’ about. 
  Such positioning (as well as his avowal of membership in the category of 
‘neighbour’ — one who may thereby be expected to know, more intimately than a 
stranger would, about the actuality of Bryant’s character) works both to provide a 
warrant for the veracity of Featherstone’s account and also to produce him as a 
normative comparison against which Bryant may be understood. Featherstone’s 
account of his mundane reality-testing procedures when confronted with the 
inexplicable also clearly has elements of the ‘at first I thought X, and then I realised 
Y’ device first identified by Sacks, and subsequently elaborated in Wooffitt’s (1992) 
studies of the telling of stories of the paranormal. The device permits the telling of 
unusual or unexpected events as such, while attending to the status of the teller as a 
normal, rational perceiver who is disposed (at first) to see ordinary and not unusual 
things.  
  We further note that the direct invocation of the commonsense ‘psychiatric’ 
membership categories of ‘nut’ and ‘psycho’ is preceded (and hence framed) by 
unequivocally negative moral judgments: those of ‘mongrel’ and ‘joker’. That Bryant 
is also described in the past tense (‘He was a nut, a psycho’) further serves to 
underpin the ‘fact’ that he has always been a ‘nut’, and to cement the commonsense 
view that, in the long run, a violent outburst (‘an explosion’) may normatively be 
expected of those incumbent in the (extraordinarily overdetermined) membership 
categories of ‘psychos’, ‘loners’ and ‘nuts’. By definition, then, such categories are 
always ‘extreme case formulations’ (Pomerantz, 1986): they cannot be otherwise for 
they are reserved as explanations of extreme (as we will see here particularly, 
violent) events.v 
  Our third extract, like Extract 1, works in its headline to establish a temporally Mentality or Morality? | page 15 
sustained ‘otherness’ as characteristic of Bryant. This furthers the project of the 
concatenation of commonsense and ‘psychiatric’ membership categorisations to 
produce another version of Bryant grounded in the experience of those who may be 
seen to have a particularly strong epistemological warrant for the claims they make 
about him. 
Extract 3: ‘Young man dogged by tragedy’ 
Bryant, variously described by acquaintances and former friends as slow, 
mentally ill and schizophrenic, became friends with a woman in New Town 
who lived in a mansion on Clare Street. 
(The Age, 30th April 1996) 
Bryant is ‘variously’ described by ‘acquaintances and former friends’ (members of 
categories that must have intimate first-hand knowledge of the man as a natural 
predicate of such membership) in terms of his membership in both lay and, 
notionally, expert-defined psychiatric categories: ‘slow’, ‘mentally ill’ and 
‘schizophrenic’. The range of cited categories, and the implication of a broad array of 
sources, suggests that though there may be dispute about the specific ‘type’ of 
problem afflicting Bryant, general agreement exists about problems of a psychiatric 
nature that have been observed independently by a number of people close to him. 
We note however, that the headline here implies indeterminacy as to cause: Bryant is 
a young man (not, say, as would also have been an equally correct categorisation, a 
‘mass murderer’ or ‘cold-blooded killer’) who has been ‘dogged by tragedy’. This 
exemplifies the central paradox inherent in both the media coverage of the case and 
the task of the professionals enlisted to account for it: the juggling of the possibility 
of Bryant’s simultaneous membership in incongruous categories (sane vs. mad; 
normal vs. abnormal; ordinary member vs. not ordinary member) with very 
different moral implications.vi 
  Here in short is the paradox — and it is one that shifts the locus of the ‘problem’ 
from the ‘psychiatric’ to the overtly moral plane: if Bryant is indeed best 
characterised as a ‘young man dogged by tragedy’, then he is a member of a shared 
social order and, therefore, morally (and legally) accountable for his actions. If he is 
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ordinary member — ‘one of us’ — then the explanation of the shootings 
accomplished by and through his membership in the category ‘madman’ collapses. 
  Of course, like professionals, lay people can be wrong about their appraisals. 
Institutionally, ‘mental illnesses’ and the ‘proper’ use of psychiatry’s diagnostic 
categories, require an official diagnosis by those with specifically ratified knowledge 
entitlements, such as psychiatrists and psychologists. But what, at the time, were 
such experts saying in their official diagnoses of Bryant? 
Extract 4: ‘Danger is a solitary white male bearing a gun and a grudge’ 
Professor Paul Mullen, who is a Monash University academic and the clinical 
director of Victoria’s Forensic Psychiatry Service, says that despite the aberrant 
nature of their crimes, most mass murderers are not technically mentally ill. Most 
though are clearly abnormal simply by virtue of their abnormal acts. And although 
each massacre is ‘a unique horror’, the killers can be categorised. 
(The Australian, 30th April 1996) 
In several respects, then, the professional ‘explanations’ are fraught with 
incongruity. Mass murder becomes not a ‘symptom’ or predicate of ‘mental illness’, 
as Mr Featherstone’s commonsensical members’ account may have implied (‘he was 
a psycho, a nut’); rather here Mullen’s reported characterisation actively seeks to 
disrupt the normatively expected activity-membership category predication (mass 
murders are committed by madmen) via a re-categorisation of the action in question. 
Bryant’s action is categorised as an aberration (a deviation, a wandering from, or 
lapse of, ‘normal’ forms of comportment) and, in this respect, it is contended that it 
cannot be attributed to mental illness in the ‘technical’ sense.  
  So to what does the clinical director of Victoria’s Forensic Psychiatry Service 
attribute the ‘aberrant nature’ of the crime? Faced with the incongruity we have 
already noted, what is offered must be true because it is tautological: mass 
murderers ‘are clearly abnormal simply by virtue of their abnormal acts’. The 
professional ‘categorisation’ merely tells us that to act ‘abnormally’ is the natural 
predicate of none other than ... ‘abnormal’ persons. One might speculate whether, if 
such a characterisation had been warranted by a lesser source than a university 
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However, the qualification ‘technical’ does, we suspect, some important work in this 
extract. Professor Mullen’s account (and its implicit endorsement in The Australian’s 
report) works to underpin the necessity of expert knowledge in accounting for 
crimes such as mass murder, whilst at the same time declining to offer a substantive 
‘technical’ or ‘expert’ account for the events under scrutiny. The notion of the 
‘technical sense’ of mental illness (which clearly invokes an unvoiced ‘commonsense 
sense’ of mental illness) introduced in Mullen’s account may then be read, in 
conjunction with the earlier uncoupling of normative action predicate-pairing, as a 
strategic move to privilege psychiatry’s voice in accounts of disturbing conduct. 
Who else but psychiatric experts have the right to lay claim to mastery of the 
‘technicalities’ of those actions which do and do not count as ‘mental illness’, or 
reconcile the ‘uniqueness’ of such ‘horrors’ with the seemingly consequent 
impossibility of constructing rigorous taxonomies — ‘categories’ of ‘killers’? Again, 
paradoxically, by coming close to claiming that shooting thirty-five strangers is the 
action of a ‘technically’ sane man, Mullen’s characterisation — or at least that 
reported by The Age as being quoted by Mr Avery, Bryant’s defence lawyer (Extract 
5, below) — serves to disqualify ‘commonsense’ accounts as insufficiently informed 
about the sophisticated ‘technicalities’ of these matters. 
  Little wonder, then, that, at the trial, no firm ‘technical’ categorisation could be 
officially reached: 
Extract 5: ‘Lawyer says killer accepts his punishment’ 
Of three medical reports on Bryant, the defence would place most reliance on 
that of Professor Paul Mullen, which said that Bryant was not insane when he 
murdered 35 people and attempted to murder 20. Mr Avery said that Bryant was 
a man of limited intellectual capacity who did not fit into a neat pigeon-hole of a 
particular mental illness. 
(The Age, 21st November 1996) 
Even taking into account the notorious unreliability of diagnosis and the 
questionable validity of diagnostic categories in psychiatry (Boyle, 2002; 1999;  see 
Extract 6 below), the precise, dare we say it, ‘technical’ nature of Bryant’s ‘disorder’ 
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negative one: the experts agreed on what Bryant was not, but could not agree on 
what he was. The expert witnesses effectively had no more of a positive ‘scientific’ 
categorisation, hence explanation, than his former neighbours and acquaintances: 
Extract 6: ‘First insights on massacre’ 
Bryant suffered from a lifelong personality disorder that prosecution psychiatrist 
Dr Ian Sale diagnosed as Asperger’s Syndrome, similar to autism. Professor 
Mullen disagreed. But all medical experts were unanimous that Bryant did not 
suffer from mental illness and was not schizophrenic. 
(The Age, 21st November 1996) 
  However, apart from clinicians and those with first-hand lay knowledge of 
perpetrators, members of other categories may be deployed by the media to 
complicate these diagnoses. For example, category members with ‘expertise’ on 
‘mass killers’ given by their incumbency are produced to officially ratify what may 
be seen as merely speculative categorisations. 
Extract 7: ‘Police portrait of a mass killer’ 
The gunman responsible for the massacre was aged 29, possibly a 
schizophrenic, who had planned the murders and probably knew one or two 
of his victims, police said this morning. 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 30th April 1996) 
Here, in precisely the same manner as the British press constructed Anthony Smith 
(Leudar & Thomas, 2000), the ‘portrait of a mass killer’ loses any personal 
identification, with Bryant becoming a ‘gunman’ who is possibly ‘a schizophrenic’ 
rather than a person, Martin Bryant, who possibly suffers from schizophrenia. As we 
saw in Extract 2, where the predicate ‘explosion’ is normatively bound to the 
category ‘loner’, here the Herald and/or the police bind schizophrenia per se, rather 
than a specific individual, to violence and killing. ‘Massacre’ and ‘murder’ then, as in 
Leudar and Thomas’s analysis, appear as ‘natural’ predicates of the category 
‘schizophrenic’ — at least according to police expertise and despite the later 
unanimity of the clinicians ‘that Bryant did not suffer from mental illness and was 
not schizophrenic’. The explanation of ‘killing’ is accomplished by characterising the 
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‘Why the thing happened is not a question. That it happened is explained by the 
very characterization’. Then, to bolster this, the warrant of the reporting category 
‘police’ works further to give the proffered characterisation a sanctionable ‘truth’. 
  Again, in this extract, we see the tension inherent in accounting for Bryant’s 
actions. Inasmuch as the Herald deploys the category ‘police’ to establish ‘senseless’ 
killing as a predicate of insanity, so psychiatry tells us — in both formal pedagogic 
texts (e.g. Hamilton, 1976) and in the advice to the lay person offered by psychiatric 
services (e.g. Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged Care, 2000) — that 
the natural predicates of the membership category ‘schizophrenic’ are loss of reason 
and of contact with ‘reality’. Such attributes sit uneasily with the characterisation of 
the ‘mass killer’ as having carefully planned his actions. Similarly ‘murders’ are, in 
law, committed by those with mens rea, with agency and with volitional control, 
predicates normatively understood as outwith the category ‘schizophrenic’. 
  We have seen that, in reports of everyday characterisation, members produce 
intrinsically adequate explanatory accounts of the shootings by drawing upon, and 
blending, commonsense categories (‘nut’, mongrel’, ‘slow’) with what may be 
thought to be specifically ‘psychiatric’ ones (‘psycho’, ‘schizophrenic’, ‘mentally ill’). 
We have also seen that institutional psychiatry may work to disqualify 
commonsense explanation by the manipulation of the membership categories 
normatively expected to be bound to given specific actions, and the introduction of 
notions such as the distinction between ‘technical’ and (presumably) non-technical 
ways of being ‘mentally ill’. But, in terms of the requirements of institutional, and 
specifically medico-legal, accounting, there is a problem: how can psychiatry 
characterise Bryant in such a manner that does the work of explanation, but which 
simultaneously retains his status as an accountable moral actor? We have already 
seen part of the necessarily incongruous answer (Extracts 4-6), but the following 
report makes it even more patent: 
Extract 9: ‘No Motive No mercy No remorse’ 
Martin Bryant, in the months following the Port Arthur tragedy, was 
examined by four psychologists and psychiatrists. They all concluded that, 
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intelligence tests, in the borderline range between intellectual disability and 
the ‘dull normal individual’, he was not criminally insane, and did not suffer 
from serious mental illness — such as depression or schizophrenia. In other 
words, in the opinion of those psychologists and psychiatrists who examined 
him, Bryant was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and 
understood, in the words of Paul Mullen, a forensic psychiatrist from Monash 
University, ‘what it meant to be guilty and to be not guilty’. 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 23rd November 1996) 
We see here a skilful resolution of the essential tension between Bryant’s 
incongruous candidate category memberships. He is produced by psychiatry and 
psychology in terms of ‘diagnostic’ categories which essentially place him in a 
technically contrived third space, a no-man’s land. He is ‘personality disordered’ but 
not insane; he is intellectually deficient but insufficiently retarded to be exculpable; 
he is both ‘of us’ and ‘not of us’. Enough is retained of commonsense members’ 
understandings of characterisations such as ‘psycho’, ‘mentally ill’ or ‘nut’ to do the 
work of explanation (the shootings are explained by Bryant’s institutionally-ratified 
membership in the category ‘psychologically disturbed’). Yet he is simultaneously 
not enough of a ‘nut’ to be ‘let off the hook’: he is, again via the ratification of 
institutional psychiatry, made sufficiently akin to ordinary members, to being ‘one 
of us’, as to be held morally and legally accountable. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that media reporting of social life is an important and rich source of 
data for the understanding of the workings of a culture. But further: how 
professionalised knowledges (specifically the classificatory systems of psychiatry 
and clinical psychology) are brought into play in these reports can show us, 
following Sacks, that the deployment of identifications/categorisations can and 
does, in and of itself, do the work of explanation. The repertoires of identity 
constructed in the Australian print media for Bryant (as ‘monster’, ‘psychiatric case’ 
and ‘child’) turn upon the category-bound activities associated with such identities, 
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of Bryant and his actions which retain his status as an agentic, accountable, moral 
actor — and hence liable to the full force of the criminal law — but which also 
manage the production of an ‘explanation’ of the inexplicable. Thus Bryant was 
produced as ‘monstrous’, but capable of human kindness; as ‘childish’, but as a child 
of an age to know right from wrong; as ‘psychologically disturbed’, but not as 
clinically insane. 
  It can be seen here, then, that not only can characterisation do the work of 
explaining, but also that there appears to be no principled way of separating out (as 
somehow epistemologically distinct) the candidate category of ‘psychiatric case’ (in 
either its ‘technical’ or its ‘commonsense’ variant), from the others made available in 
these accounts. Rather, the manner in which the professions (along with and via the 
popular media) draw upon these membership categorisation devices suggests that 
they are not the dispassionate, objective, scientific nosologies that the disciplines so 
often claim them to be. Rather, they are powerful and contingent devices which can 
be — and here are — pressed into local service in public discourse not to so much to 
accomplish ‘medical diagnosis’ as to pass ‘moral verdict’ (see Sarbin and Mancuso, 
1984). 
  Can we conclude from this analysis anything of value about the more general 
question of discourse as such and its possible relation(s) to psychology, given that 
there are important debates on this matter currently circulating in the discipline 
(Wetherell, 1998; Schegloff, 1998)? One position we have come to, via this analysis 
and numerous others involving naturally-occurring textual and conversational 
materials, is that it is important to recognise that, in terms of methods of accounting 
(if not, always, of surface ‘content’), there is a much narrower gap than is sometimes 
supposed between ‘lay’ and ‘professional’ attention to broadly psychological 
matters. We are not quite saying that professional psychology or its sister disciplines 
are mere common sense dressed up as science; rather that the ‘how’ of generating 
accounts, in both cases, draws upon a common set of culturally shared resources, 
many of which have already been both carefully and elegantly described by, 
notably, Harvey Sacks (1992). In the present case, for example, this has concerned 
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accomplish practical moral judgements; and to accomplish these as opposed to (or at 
least prior to), for example, ‘scientific facts’. 
  Accordingly we feel no pressing need to theorise how some general formation of 
human actions and practices — called, perhaps, ‘discourse’ — should be treated 
within the professional discipline of psychology itself. Our overwhelming 
impression is that (in shorthand) the ‘psychological’ and the ‘discursive’ are always 
already practically tied, and importantly, tied prior to any after-the-fact theorisation 
and that this ‘tie’ needs to be more carefully and descriptively treated within 
professional psychology prior to any of its claims to specialised knowledge and, 
especially, to ‘scientificity’. Otherwise (especially ‘social’) psychology may be 
missing its fundamental and grounding topic of investigation. 
  That is, the ‘logos’ of psycho-logy need not immediately refer to something like 
‘the science of...’. It can, as it routinely is in English translations of, for example, 
Aristotle, be thought of as pointing more primordially to something like the word 
‘account’. (Or, just perhaps, this could be extended from ‘account’ to ‘discourse 
upon’; though we need not go quite that far.) We can add to this the fact that, in 
ancient Greek thinking, ‘psyché’ originally had no cognitivist or mentalistic shades 
of meaning (these having been imported via Latinisation). Instead, ‘psyché’ was 
always something more like a given ground, a basis on which, for example, actions 
were possible. In the light of this etymological re-working — speculative as it may 
be; though no more speculative than the now-intuitive idea of ‘psyche’ as ‘mind’ or 
‘soul’ — it becomes possible to think of ‘psycho-logy’ as any accounting for the basis 
or ground, perhaps even the ‘methods’ or cultural ‘techniques’, on which practical 
actions are possible. 
  As we have seen in the present investigation, such accountings for the grounds of 
‘what we are’ (and, more importantly, the methods that generate them) are already 
distinctively and massively present in everyday texts and talk, lay or professional — 
for example, we can’t not refer to our cultural co-members and, in so referring, we 
cannot but categorise them. To this extent, there is no need for a ‘theory’ of the 
relation between ‘discourse’ and ‘psychology’. The latter term always already 
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‘psyche’. So professional psychology’s self-appointed position as a specialised 
explanatory science (‘logos’?) of the mind (‘psyché’?) has, since its (historically quite 
recent) inception, neglected that a ‘logos’ of ‘psyché’ (in the quite different senses of 
these terms indicated above) has inhabited the ordinary lifeworld since ancient times 
and, in neglecting this, it has over-ridden its primary descriptive task. 
  Then, with Wittgenstein (1968, para. 109), we are led to the inevitable conclusion 
that ‘We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its 
place’. Still, the description in question, given the conditions we have outlined here, 
must entail a respecification of how (the ways in which) persons categorise 
themselves and each other; and this respecification cannot shy away from the 
possibility that the traditional avatars of the psy-complex have made an elementary 
mistake, thereby opening themselves to critique (or, as Wittgenstein would say, 
‘therapy’). The mistake is this: recondite, scientific, or technical means of 
categorisation do not precede and over-ride ordinary everyday means of 
categorisation. Rather they are predicated upon them. 
 
 
i.  We thank Tracey Summerfield of the Murdoch Law School for this point and her 
help and advice more generally on this section of the paper. 
ii.   These observations, of course, form the basis of the critique by discursive 
psychologists of attribution theory. We are grateful to Derek Edwards for this point. 
iii.   See Silverman (1998, pp. 74-97) for an extended discussion of MCDs and their 
application rules. 
iv.  The materials we refer to in this paper are extracted from an extensive data 
corpus collected by David McCarthy as part of his Honours work on the Bryant case. 
The corpus contains every report we have identified from Australian journals of 
record on the massacre and the subsequent trial. This corpus is available for 
inspection by readers of this paper who may wish to re-work our analyses of the 
extracts. Mentality or Morality? | page 24 
 
v.  Accordingly, we frequently hear mitigated ascriptions of madness: ‘Yeh, he was 
a nut, but he was harmless’ on the assumption that, sans mitigation, violence is 
madness’s routine natural predicate. See Leudar and Thomas (2000). 
vi.  Because ‘incongruous’ can be taken mundanely to mean ‘ill fitting’, we develop 
the term from Sacks’s usage (cf. incongruous membership ascriptions and avowals) 
to mean ‘elements of a paradox’. Hence the incongruities ‘of us’ vs. ‘not of us’ (and 
the rest) go to make up an overall paradoxical problem of identification. Mentality or Morality? | page 25 
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